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Abstract 
 
Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are 
spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases 
the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by 
practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an 
alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific 
value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic 
literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, 
especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and 
the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public 
service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a 
noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally 
private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of 
private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the 
(public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, 
according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that 
under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric 
information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” 
regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of 
the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private 
operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the 
fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, 
etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed 
enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives 
(respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from 
incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a 
disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective 
protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some 
policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some 
empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector. 
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Introduction 
The attention that EU institutions, national governments and local public authorities pay 
to new forms of cooperation with the private sector, which we call Public Private 
Partnerships (PPPs), is growing. For instance, the European Commission (EC) published 
two reports dealing with PPPs (Guidelines on public-private partnerships and Resource 
Book on PPP case studies, respectively in 2003 and 2004) and a Green Paper in 2004 by 
which a public consultation was opened. In 2005, the EC adopted a Communication 
presenting policy-options with a view to ensuring effective competition for PPPs and 
currently is carrying out an Impact Assessment to evaluate the effects of future public 
procurement legislations. 
PPP is an umbrella notion covering a wide range of economic activities in constant 
transformation; in a very general way, it can be defined as the partial transfer to the 
private sector of projects and services traditionally executed and/or financed by the public 
sector (EC, 2003a, 96)1. 
We limit the scope of our analysis to PPPs created at the local level to provide public 
services, such as water distribution and waste water treatment, urban waste collection, 
local public transport, and so on.  
In the European Union (EU), although many governments of Member States have a long-
lasting tradition of providing these services in-house, we observe a significant shift 
towards an increasing involvement of the private sector. In the last 30 years, many local 
public enterprises have been replaced by entirely private ones operating under concession 
or have been transformed into mixed entities (see COX, 1999).  
We focus on these mixed entities, also called mixed enterprises. In local utilities, mixed 
enterprises are companies jointly owned by municipalities and private firms that assume 
                                                 
1 This is a flexible definition that embraces the wide variety of PPP forms implemented in EU and all over 
the world. For an overview of PPP practices, see EC, 2003b, 16. 
  1 
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co-responsibility for investments in infrastructure and service delivery2. 
The purpose of this paper is to present an economic analysis of mixed enterprises and 
distinctively of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller, 
while the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider.  
Our discussion will be frankly speculative in at least two respects. Firstly, mixed 
enterprises will be addressed from several perspectives. In this regard, we will understand 
a mixed enterprise as a governance structure (compared to in-house management and 
concession to totally private enterprise), as a productive organisation (compared to totally 
private and public firms), and finally as a regulatory scheme (an alternative to the well-
known external regulatory devices). Given the large amount of implications raised, our 
objective is to provide the reader with an analytical framework and some clear 
propositions. 
Secondly, the Italian water sector does not yet constitute a good empirical benchmark to 
test our conclusions: the recent reform implementation does not offer solid evidence in 
terms of sample size and above all series length. Moreover, the reorganisation of the 
sector was slow and still remains partial despite the marked acceleration in 2002: at the 
end of 2004, water services were assigned in only 47 basins (out of 91). As soon as more 
consolidated data becomes available, we will be able to examine our theses more 
accurately.  
Missing best practices in the Italian water sector can not restrain us from drawing some 
constructive conclusions. We suggest that the concession to mixed enterprises could 
embody, under certain conditions, a valuable alternative to the traditional public 
provision and the concession to totally private enterprise as it can push regulated 
operators to outperform and limit the risk of opportunistic conducts. To carry out such a 
study, we use the framework provided by property rights theory. In particular, we adopt 
the insight by which ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information 
about the actual management of the firm.   
Following such a stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed 
enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and 
regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, 
the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the 
regulatory body) can stimulate the service provider to lower operating costs and monitor 
it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public 
service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the 
 
2 In the EU this special form of PPP is extraordinary widespread and has an established tradition in many 
Member States (i.e., the Société d’économie mixte (SEM) in France and the Stadtwerke in Germany). 
DEXIA (2004) identified some emerging trends in Europe: rapid increases were recorded in Germany, 
Hungary and Italy; regular increases in Austria, Greece, Portugal, Sweden, and France. On the other hand, 
mixed entities were decreasing in Belgium. Even if figures differ from country to country, the overall trend 
was towards a significant increase. DEXIA (2002, 3) calculated its number has grown from 10% in 1999 to 
20% in 2002, and in the new enlarged EU, mixed enterprises are around 3.500 units. 
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mixed enterprise board of directors can represent a suitable place where public and 
private sector representatives (respectively, welfare3 and profit maximisers) can meet to 
solve all disputes usually deriving from incomplete contracts, without having recourse to 
third parties. 
The paper is organised as follows. We first examine the common rationales behind the 
creation of mixed enterprises, in general. Secondly, we address the relationship between 
ownership and information. We turn next to stress the relevance of identifying a specific 
configuration of mixed enterprises to build on our analysis, and we present our model. 
Then, we ask: 1) how is the performance of regulated firms affected by regulation rather 
than by other factors, such as ownership; 2) thus, whether in our mixed enterprise model 
the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm but also as member of the 
regulatory agency) is able to reduce the burden of asymmetric information and regulate 
more effectively (that is, providing more incentives for productive efficiency); 3) finally, 
whether our model allows lower transaction costs necessary to let concessions work 
properly by solving internally (on the board of directors) all the disputes between the 
public authority and the private operator usually arising from incomplete contracts. In the 
last section, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention into the 
“private” administration or an ineffective protection of the general interest would imply 
many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications to make feasible an equitable debate 
on the board of the firm.  
 
1. Mixed enterprises, three rationales behind 
In this section, we shall consider why municipalities choose mixed enterprises to deliver 
local public services.  
We well know the rationales behind public intervention in the economy and, more 
specifically, in local utilities. Local utilities are intrinsically characterised by market 
failures: many of them, for example, are natural monopoly. This is not the only economic 
justification, although the most important one, adopted by municipalities to enter service 
delivery. Further market failures, such as public or semi-public goods, asymmetric 
information and externalities, need to be addressed by direct public sector intervention. 
Finally, sustainability is also an important factor in services having a strong impact on the 
environment (MASSARUTTO, 2001).  
These considerations weaken the case for privatisation of local utilities and support those 
in favour of enterprises totally owned (and run) by the public. However, although there is 
sufficient room to justify municipalities entering utilities, we have to recognise that the 
public sector more often than not needs to involve private operators because of their 
superior know-how, experience and financial capabilities.  
 
3 We use a welfare measure, W = S(p) + Π (respectively, consumer surplus and producer surplus), that 
weights benefits and losses to consumers and producers equally. 
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Understanding the standpoint from which we study mixed enterprises is crucial. In local 
utilities, the choice of a governance structure (to deliver services) over another is under 
the responsibility of municipalities. Roughly, every local authority has three options. It 
can opt for traditional in-house provision (by public enterprises), or choose PPP, and this 
in two alternative forms: contractual PPP (cPPP) or institutional PPP (iPPP). The cPPP is 
typically represented by the concession to an entirely private operator; the iPPP is the 
concession to a public-private joint-venture. In the EU, in effect, public authorities can 
delegate service management to these mixed enterprises that operate under usual 
concession schemes. However, the fact that the public authority is both inside the firm (as 
owner/controller) and outside (involved in the regulatory body) implies certain 
peculiarities that make it a special governance structure4.  
Each of these three governance structures (in-house, cPPP and iPPP) entails advantages 
and disadvantages for local authorities. 
 
Fig. 1: What governance structure in local utilities? 
 
 
We concentrate on concessions to mixed enterprises, and analyse three possible reasons 
behind this choice:  
- greater financial resources,  
- higher productive efficiency,  
                                                 
4 It is not our purpose to discuss the overall regulatory design set by Law no. 36/94. We limit to remark in 
this footnote that in each optimal territorial basin (ATO) local authorities on the one side embody the 
regulatory agency (AATO), on the other side own (partially or entirely) the water service company. Even 
though some paradoxical circumstances might arise from such scheme, conflicts of interest can be easily 
circumvented by strictly defining the notion of control and the activities that have to be fulfilled by local 
authorities (see COVIRI, 2004, 102). 
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- more effective (public) control over service management.   
Firstly, the stringent financial constraints set by the Stability and Growth Pact have 
forced many municipalities to look to private funding to build new infrastructures and/or 
renew existing ones. The opening of public enterprises to capital from private 
shareholders is for local governments a means to circumvent financial straits (see 
DEXIA, 2004, 24). This is evident in the Italian water sector, where concessions to mixed 
enterprises represent the preferred way to address the need for urgent and significant 
investments. We observe that investment per kilometre of network projected in Basin 
Plans supplied by mixed enterprises is on average €141.000,36 against €112.000,37 for 
totally public enterprises5.  
Secondly, the prospect of higher productivity is unequivocally one of the major drivers 
moving Italian municipalities towards mixed enterprises: project operating costs 
(operating costs estimated at the Basin Plan level) of mixed enterprises are expected to be 
lower than those of totally public enterprises. From the second and third graphs in fig. 2 
we observe the estimated evolution of operating costs over the next 20 years in 32 Basin 
Plans, among which 24 iPPP and 8 in-house: a tendency to greater efficiency 
enhancements is sharply distinguishable in the former. 
Moreover, the last graph in fig. 2 shows the overall cost difference expected on average 
in basins supplied by mixed enterprises and by totally public enterprises. The contribution 
of the private sector is identifiable by looking at the operating costs during the first year 
(on average 0,82€ against 0,88€ for totally public enterprises), and over the entire 
concession period with an expected decrease of 12,65% (against the 8,23% decrease in 
totally public enterprises). 
Even though these results do not demonstrate any supremacy of mixed enterprises over 
totally public enterprises6, they need to be carefully considered7. 
It is largely accepted that private sector involvement, at least potentially, brings more 
financial capabilities and better productive performance. However, we want to go further 
and identify another advantage of iPPP for municipalities. 
 
5 Data are from 40 Basin Plans (27 under iPPP and 13 under in-house). Notice that the difference could be 
larger if we exclude ATO Unico Puglia (the first aqueduct in Europe and the third in the world, with 19.635 
km of network, 4.623.349 inhabitants served, 309.416.113 m³ drinking water supplied), where an enormous 
amount of investment (€4.670.077.000) was deliberated in its Basin Plan (2005). Without ATO Unico 
Puglia, the investment per Kilometre of network in basins provided by totally public enterprises would be 
appreciably lower, on average €99,16. 
6 Such evidence does not fit at all into the debate concerning private, mixed and public firms as discussed in 
section 2.3. 
7 This result matches with our assumption that PPPs (whether cPPP or iPPP) are chosen by municipalities 
as long as private provision outperforms the public one. Otherwise, there would be no reason to consider 
PPP as Pareto superior to in-house management. The Pareto criterion, as we know, ranks an allocation x 
over an allocation y if some people are better off at x and no one else is harmed. If that condition is met, we 
say that x is Pareto improving to y. 
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Thirdly, and above all, a significant public participation in the capital of mixed 
enterprises allows local authorities a more successful control over the service 
management [than in case of concessions to entirely private firms (cPPP)]. We develop 
this reasoning in section 2.4; at this stage, it is sufficient to make clear that municipalities 
by retaining a relevant proportion of the equity can properly fulfil their task of protecting 
the general interest underlying utilities8. 
 
Fig. 2: More planned investments and lower project operating costs in iPPP 
 
 
Own elaboration on data COVIRI (2005). 
 
In tab. 1, we present the public-private participation in the capital of 7 mixed enterprises, 
a small number but indicative of the general trend in which total public shares are never 
below 51%. By retaining the majority of the capital, the pubic can gather more 
                                                 
8 We share the public interest perspective and do not intend to include the private interest one in our 
analysis. Throughout the paper we assume that public representatives in mixed enterprises (and regulators) 
try to benefit society.   
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information about actual management and have a greater say on the board of the firm9. If 
ownership gives proprietary information, this can be used by local authorities to stimulate 
the service provider to lower operating costs and monitor it more effectively with respect 
to the fulfilment of contractual obligations.  
 
Tab. 1: Public-private capital sharing 
Mixed enterprises Public participation Private participation 
Acque SpA 55% 45% 
Publiacqua SpA 60% 40% 
Nuove Acque SpA 54% 46% 
Acquedotto del Fiora SpA 60% 40% 
SII SpA 51% 49% 
Acqualatina SpA 51% 49% 
GORI SpA 81% 19% 
Source: BARDELLI, PERUZZI and SBANDATI (2002, 5). 
 
2. An economic analysis of mixed enterprises 
In the following pages, we propose the mixed enterprise as a feasible way to operate the 
public infrastructure in delivering services. To limit the scope of our analysis, we 
examine the “operational” stage, leaving aside the “building and financing” phase; 
moreover, the role of the private sector in financing the construction of infrastructures is 
well known (see EC, 2003a). 
When municipalities are not satisfied by in-house management, they opt for PPPs, via 
concessions to totally private enterprises (cPPP) or mixed enterprises (iPPP). As 
governments intervene in service provision in order to cope with market failures and/or 
distributional concerns, we infer that the private sector is mainly involved to enhance 
productive efficiency. 
Theoretically, as we have seen above, private know-how and capabilities should translate 
into lower operating costs. Practically, public intervention is still necessary, firstly to 
make sure that lower costs mean in fact lower tariffs, and secondly to stimulate the 
operator to be more and more efficient. Lastly, the public authority must ensure the 
fulfilment of other obligations (public services obligations, quality standards, etc.). In 
section 2.3 to 2.4, we investigate whether mixed enterprises can support the following 
propositions: 
                                                 
9 However, a public majority can be held by plenty of small municipalities that, to exert effectively control, 
would need to be extremely united and coordinated; see LOBINA (2005) with regards to Nuove Acque SpA.  
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- the more the information available, the more effective the incentive provided by the 
regulator will be and the stronger the efficiency enhancement attained by the service 
provider; 
- the dual role that public authorities hold (as owner/controller of the regulated firm and 
as member of the regulatory agency) can be used to strictly control the private 
partner/provider. Hence, the more effective the public partner monitoring activity, the 
less is the risk of private opportunism. 
Before addressing production and information costs, we need to clarify preliminarily two 
crucial initial assumptions: 
1) retaining some ownership allows the public authority to gather more information about 
actual costs and, more in general, service management; 
2) to study mixed enterprises, we need to identify the specific configuration we are 
referring to. 
To sustain the thesis that public participation in the capital of a firm serves to cope with 
the typical asymmetric information in the agency relationship between regulators and 
regulated, we rely on property rights theory. SCHMIDT (1996) argued that  
“If the government gives up control of the firm and privatizes, then it will have less 
information about the firm’s costs (and profits) as compared to the situation where it 
controls the firm as a nationalized company. To justify this assumption, we have to 
explain why the government cannot write a contract with the private owner requiring that 
the government will receive all relevant information. The argument is that having access 
to inside information of a firm is not a specific right, which can be contracted upon 
easily, but rather a residual right, which is tied together with ownership. Information is 
not just available in a firm- it has to be produced, collected, accounted, processed, and 
transmitted, and it is the owner who in the end controls this process of information 
production. Therefore the owner is always able to manipulate the information. For 
example, she may manipulate transfer price, thus shifting profits from one division of her 
firm to another, or she may choose among different depreciation methods, thus shifting 
profits between periods, etc. After the information has been produced, it is impossible to 
verify it to an outsider even if the owner wishes to do so” (SCHMIDT, 1996, 9)10. 
 
10 A similar aspect was discussed by WILLIAMSON (1975), who emphasised that different organisational 
structures imply different and concomitant changes in the information flow. Particularly, the author 
distinguished the information that external auditors (versus internal ones) may collect: “An external auditor 
is typically constrained to review written records and documents and in other respects restricts the scope of 
his investigation to clearly pertinent matters. An internal auditor, by contrast, has greater freedom of 
action, both to include less formal evidence and to explore the byways into which his investigation leads” 
(WILLIAMSON, 1975, 29). According to the interpretation offered by RIORDAN (1990), GROSSMAN 
and HART (1986) seemed to deny that ownership gives more information. Discussing the change in 
information consequent on vertical integration, they maintained that any audit an employer can have done 
of his subsidiary is also feasible when the subsidiary is a separate company. However, in a footnote, they 
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Thus, we share the view that ownership gives the public partner more proprietary 
information, which if correctly gathered and transferred can be used by the public 
regulator11.  
Another facet to be addressed is the configuration of the mixed enterprise under 
investigation. Mixed enterprises differ not only from totally public and totally private 
ones: they also differ among themselves. We identify public-private capital sharing and 
allocation of tasks between partners as the main factors affecting the goal orientation of 
mixed enterprises’ and subsequently their performance. For example, it is easy to see that 
an enterprise will behave differently depending on whether its majority is owned by the 
public or private sector. 
According to us, a missing identification of mixed enterprises represents one of the major 
obstacles in studying these entities. To support this view, we present a critical short 
survey of the economic literature on mixed enterprises (section 2.1). Then, in section 2.2, 
we describe our model, in which the private partner is in charge of service provision 
while the public is in charge of controlling over the former. 
 
2.1. A survey of the literature 
In our view, different public-private capital sharing and different allocation of tasks 
between partners affect the mixed enterprise’s goal orientation and thus its performance. 
Initially, the literature concerning mixed enterprises was largely normative (rather than 
positive) and descriptive (rather than analytical)12. As observed by MAZZOLINI (1979), 
“it can generally be faulted for prescribing principles where the validity has not been 
clearly verified … (moreover) it tends to lack a solid empirical base” (MAZZOLINI, 
1979, 6).  
More sophisticated studies came out in the 1980s and 90s, investigating mixed enterprises 
along two different streams of research.  
On the one side, some positive theory was developed to analyse the relationship between 
mixed ownership and firm conduct13. For us, the assumptions and propositions were 
sometimes overly simplistic because of the absence of a precise up-stream identification 
of the research subject. Some of the remarkable results achieved are summed up in the 
specified that the right to audit is sometimes a residual right rather than a contractible right, thus confirming 
that information depends on ownership patterns (see GROSSMAN and HART, 1986, 695). 
11 As seen above, in the Italian water sector, local authority representatives participate in the board of the 
regulated firm and in the assembly of the Basin Authority (the regulator). 
12 See for example MUSOLF (1972), ROBSON (1972), BOARDMAN and VINING (1985), ELFORD and 
STANBURY (1982), BOARDMAN, ECKEL and VINING (1986), BROOKS (1987). 
13 See VIALLET (1983), BOARDMAN, ECKEL and VINING (1986), ECKEL and VINING (1985), 
SCHMITZ (2000). 
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following quotations: 
- mixed enterprises can accomplish profitability and social goals at a lower cost than 
public enterprise because of the effect of profit monitoring by private shareholders. In 
this respect, mixed enterprises can embody a cost-minimising method to achieve a 
combination of both goals (ECKEL and VINING, 1985, 85). 
- mixed enterprises may work successfully, because they can embody a cost-
minimising way for government to reconcile profit and social welfare; give inside 
information to the government in a simple and cheap way; avoid costly accounting 
procedures and other government restrictions and control which prevail in public 
enterprises (BOARDMAN, ECKEL and VINING (1986, 235). 
Without doubt, concentrating on a sole mixed enterprise model facilitates creating a solid 
work surface to develop more targeted propositions. 
On the other side, empirical studies investigated how mixed ownership can affect 
performance and the firm’s value on the market14. Again, nowhere do we find a 
classification of mixed enterprises. Concerning productive efficiency, for example, 
BOARDMAN and VINING (1989) stated that research argues that mixed enterprises 
perform better than public enterprises, but not as well as private do (BOARDMAN and 
VINING, 1989, 4). This conclusion can be challenged in many respects: other factors, 
beyond mixed ownership, affect performance (see section 2.3). 
Firstly, public-private capital sharing is relevant in characterising mixed enterprises. In 
particular, it explains to what extent public and private representatives can bring the 
firm’s goal orientation closer to respectively social welfare and profit maximisation. In a 
general way, we can affirm that the larger the proportion of total shares, the more the 
partner will be able to determine the enterprise’s conduct, and hence its performance. In 
this respect, BOARDMAN and VINING (1991, 223) argued that public-private capital 
sharing affects the firm’s final objective. More precisely, different ownership settings 
influence the extent to which mixed enterprises engage in profit maximization, social 
welfare maximization (and managerial utility maximization). Different ownership 
conditions also affect the degree of conflict between owners.  
In particular, where the public holds a large equity proportion, it has the control of the 
firm: through a high number of representatives on the board, it has a great say into its 
management. However, this straightforward proposition can be altered, for example, by a 
high concentration of private sector shares, or by being listed on a stock exchange. In the 
Italian water sector, a considerable difference exists between listed (on the Milan stock 
exchange) and unlisted mixed enterprises. In the former, the overall objective is closer to 
profit maximisation: indeed, there seems to be no room for further policies pursuing 
 
14 See MINTZ (1980); MINTZ (1982); VIALLET (1982); BOARDMAN, ECKEL, LINDE and VINING 
(1983); ECKEL and VERMAELEN (1983); BOARDMAN, LAURIN and VINING (2000); BOARDMAN 
and VINING (1989); BOARDMAN, FRIEDMAN and ECKEL (1986); EHRLICH et al. (1994); 
SUEYOSHI (1998); MOK and CHAU (2003); LEE and HWANG (2003); GUPTA (2004), CHIU (2003).  
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socio-political goals, as these would have detrimental effects on the shares value. In 
unlisted companies, instead, the representatives of the public partner are more oriented 
towards social welfare maximisation15. In this case, the economic viability of the firm 
might be threatened if protection of the general interest is used by the public partner to 
justify excessive and unjustified interference. Then, stringent rules of corporate 
governance are needed to define properly the boundaries of the partners’ role (see section 
3). 
In the next section, we analyse the second relevant factor for firm performance, which is 
the allocation of tasks between partners. 
 
2.2. Our mixed enterprise model 
Mixed enterprise is not only a public-private joint-venture owned by two partners: the 
extent to which these partners perceive and pursue their objectives depends on many 
aspects, in particular on which task they fulfil. But what are these tasks? At a practical 
level, partners can carry out an “operating” task (managing the service) and a 
“monitoring” task (controlling over the operations).  
 
Tab. 2: Public and private partner tasks in mixed enterprises 
 Scenario A Scenario B 
Operating services Private Public 
Monitoring operations Public -- 
 
In local utilities, the public partner is easily identifiable, embodied by one or more 
municipalities. Roughly, municipalities have to ensure that the management of the service 
is consistent to the principle of efficiency, efficacy and cost-effectiveness and that the 
service is supplied at satisfactory quality standards. The private partner is represented by 
industrial firms or financial institutions and their well-known goal is to make profits16. 
Depending on whether the partner is an industrial or financial partner, one arrives at 
divergent conclusions. 
In this paper, we focus on those mixed enterprises in which the private “industrial” 
partner is in charge of providing services, while the public partner is assumed to exercise 
control (tab. 2, scenario A). This is a realistic and widespread scheme as the private 
                                                 
15 In the Italian water sector, listed companies are, for example, ACEA SpA and AMGA SpA; non-listed 
companies, such as Nuove Acque SpA or Publiacqua SpA, embody properly our model and will be 
presented in section 2.2.
16 In water services management, we find industrial partners (such as Lyonnaise des Eaux, Ondeo, etc.) or 
financial partners (such as Dexia Crediop). 
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sector is usually involved in service management because of its know-how and 
experience17. It is becoming quite common in the EU and is expected to be adopted 
increasingly by municipalities in coming years, because of the advantages it could entail 
on the public partner side (in terms of less private opportunism) and on the private partner 
side (in terms of more productive efficiency). 
Moreover, it is encompassed in the general trend perceived by the EC when it observes a 
change in the role of the State in the economy, moving from a role of direct operator to 
one of organiser, regulator and controller (see EC, 2004a, § 3).  
On the side of the public partner, we are well aware that in concessions to totally private 
firms, opportunism is a major concern because of asymmetric information and 
incompleteness of contracts, and local authorities need to reduce the risk of private unfair 
conduct. Therefore, we propose our mixed enterprise model as a feasible solution. By 
retaining some ownership, the public authority is in a position to maintain an insider’s 
view of the operations, decisions and voting rights, which can be a more effective means 
of control than regulatory mechanisms alone (see UNPD and PPPUE, 2000, 11). 
On the side of the private partner, the private sector is represented by consortia. In these 
consortia the leading role is usually played by an industrial firm, which holds more than 
51% of the shares (in the consortium) and is responsible for service management. In tab. 
3, we show the private sector configuration in 7 mixed enterprises and identify for each 
the leading industrial firms.  
 
Tab. 3: Private consortia and leading industrial partners 
Mixed enterprise (ATO) Consortium Industrial partner  
Acque SpA (ATO 2 
Basso Valdarno) 
ACEA SpA, Ondeo Service SA, Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena, SILM SpA, 
Ondeo Degrement SpA, CTC 
ACEA SpA, Ondeo 
Service SA 
Publiacqua SpA (ATO 3 
Medio Valdarno) 
ACEA SpA, Ondeo Service SA, Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena, SILM SpA, 
Ondeo Degrement SpA, CTC 
ACEA SpA, Ondeo 
Service SA 
Nuove Acque SpA (ATO 
4 Alto Vardarno) 
Ondeo, AMGA SpA, Monte dei Paschi 
di Siena, Banca Popolare dell’Etruria 
e del Lazio, Consorzio IRIDE 
Ondeo, AMGA SpA 
Acquedotto del Fiora 
SpA (ATO 6 Ombrone) 
ACEA SpA, Acque Toscane SpA, 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena, SILM SpA, 
CTC, CCC, Comit, CITS 
ACEA SpA, Acque 
Toscane 
S.I.I. S.c.p.A. (ATO 
Umbria 2) 
Sewern Trent Water Service, Severn 
Trent Italia, Biodepuratrice, 
Sewern Trent Water 
Service, Severn Trent 
                                                 
17 We could also face the case in which the private partner is a “financial” partner. Then, we would refer to 
scenario B, with the public partner operating the service and the private providing mere financial 
assistance. 
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Ambiente, Omnia, SGI, RPA Italia 
Acqualatina SpA (ATO 
4 Meridionale Latina) 
CGE SpA, Enel Hydro SpA, 
Acquedotto Pugliese SpA, SIBA SpA, 
Iltacogim SpA, EMAS Ambiente 
CGE SpA, Enel Hydro 
SpA, Acquedotto 
Pugliese SpA 
G.O.R.I. SpA (ATO 3 
Sarnese Vesuviano) 
ACEA SpA, Enel Hydro SpA, SGI, 
ICAR, Dipiudi, Ctida, Siba, Dm, Lotti, 
Feronia 
ACEA SpA, Enel Hydro 
SpA 
Source: PASSARELLI and PERUZZI (2004). 
 
In the Italian water sector, the private partner is selected through a competitive tendering. 
The goal of such procedure is to identify the most efficient partner, but the outcome is 
often different.  
According to BARDELLI, PERUZZI and SBANDATI (2001), the main criterion was 
that of “the most economically advantageous tender”. Even though it has two relevant 
parameters, a technical and an economic one, most local authorities give too much 
emphasis to the latter, thus selecting not the most efficient partner but the one that allows 
maximising the recompense for the transferred equity shares. This wrongdoing could 
seriously alter the goal of providing efficient and high-quality services in the entire EU. 
For this reason, the EC envisages preparing an Interpretative Communication on this and 
related aspects in the course of 2006, which could help in attaining practices more 
consistent with the internal market goal18. 
 
2.3. Production costs 
“PPP arrangements should not be entered into merely for the sake of undertaking a PPP 
project. A detailed review of the costs and benefits of private sector involvement versus 
public alternatives must be undertaken to ensure that a PPP enhances the public benefit. 
The degree of private involvement needs to be carefully matched to the objectives and 
needs of the project and the public. Appropriateness, cost, the ability to effectively 
implement and manage should be the paramount considerations in selecting a PPP 
structure” (EC, 2003b, 9). 
The EC recommends local authorities to complete cost-benefit analyses before starting to 
deliver services. In order to simplify this enquiry, we propose to concentrate on two cost 
typologies: what we call “production” and “information” costs. While the former cost 
                                                 
18 If not well carried out, the competitive procedure “for the selection of the private partner” would not 
have the same impact on market liberalisation as the competitive tendering “for the attribution of the 
service” does. Moreover, given the steady opposition of most municipalities, not only in Italy, to delegate 
services of general interest to third (private) operators, the EC is to address the resistance to change of 
public authorities in order to find some room to introduce competition. When this aspect is solved, even the 
criticisms based on a wrong implementation of competitive procedures in iPPP can be dismantled. 
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typology does not need to be defined, the latter are meant as the costs of managing the 
relationship between public authorities and concessionaires. 
With regard to production costs, we need to understand how efficiently our mixed 
enterprise can provide the service.  
The inevitable starting point seems to be the debate concerning public versus private 
enterprises. Three distinct streams of research have compared public and private firms: 
agency/property rights, public choice and organisation theories (see VILLALONGA, 
2000). We follow the first one, which investigates how ownership matters for productive 
performance. A straightforward implication of the agency/property rights theory is that, 
under certain conditions, private ownership enhances technical efficiency19.  
In particular, the validity of privatisation is not debatable in markets where strong 
competitive pressure applies (see MEGGINSON and NETTER, 2001): many studies 
support the proposition that private firms are more efficient (and more profitable) than 
comparable public firms. But such a general conclusion is disputable when we go into 
more detail.  
Looking carefully at the liaison ownership-performance, many factors intervene to alter 
this apparently clear causal relationship. Ownership is not the only element affecting 
efficiency, even though it has attracted most attention. There are other reasons why two 
firms perform differently: apart from divergences in the degree of competition faced or in 
managerial skills, we cannot assimilate firms with different scale, or firms operating 
under non-comparable regulatory environment (see RENZETTI and DUPONT, 2003, 
10). Sometimes, as we see below, with respect to the Italian water sector, the same 
regulatory mechanism can be applied differently, invalidating the premise for any 
benchmarking analysis.  
Despite these difficulties, economists use to compare public and private firms’ 
performance. RENZETTI and DUPONT (2003) made a survey of the literature that 
investigated the implications of ownership for performance in water utilities (as 
summarised in tab. 4). The results turn out to be conflicting.  
 
 
19 Private enterprises are more efficient than public ones because of clearer corporate and managerial goals, 
harder budget constraints, more intense monitoring by shareholders than by politicians or civil servants, 
more competitive and more efficient markets for corporate and managerial control, more incentives for 
employees, more competitive product markets. See BOYCKO, SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1996); 
HANSMANN and KRAAKMAN (2000); HART, SHLEIFER and VISHNY (1997); KORNAI (1993); 
SHLEIFER (1998); VICKERS and YARROW (1991). 
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Tab. 4: Ownership and performance in water utilities 
Author Country Results 
MORGAN (1977) US Private has lower costs 
CRAIN and 
ZARDKOOHI (1978) 
US Private has lower costs 
BRUGGINK (1982) US Public cost lower by 20% 
FEIGENBAUM and 
TEEPLES (1983) 
US No difference in costs 
FOX and HOFLER 
(1986) 
US Cost ‘over-runs’ of 46% and 43% for private and 
public, respectively 
BYRNES et al. (1986) US No difference in efficiency 
TEEPLES and GLYER 
(1987) 
US No cost difference in most general model 
BYRNES (1991) US No differences in costs 
LAMBERT et al. 
(1993) 
US Public more efficient 
RAFFIEE et al. (1993) US Public and private exhibit 17% and 22% deviation from minimum cost, respectively 
LYNK (1993) US Private and public are 11.5% and 2% above respective cost frontiers 
BHATTACHARYYA 
et al. (1994) 
US No difference in overall efficiency but private are 
technically more inefficient 
BHATTACHARYYA 
et al. (1995a) 
US Public and private exhibit 10% and 19% deviation 
from minimum cost, respectively 
BHATTACHARYYA 
et al. (1995b) 
US Private are 91% efficient while public are 85–90% 
efficient 
SHAOUL 1997 UK Privatisation raised profits but little else 
CUBBIN and 
TZANIDAKIS 1998 
UK Methods yield different rankings of relative 
efficiency 
ASHTON 2000 UK Post-privatisation average efficiency is 85% and range is 77–100% 
SAAL and PARKER 
2000 
UK Tightened price regulation lowered costs but 
privatisation didn’t 
MENARD and 
SAUSSIER 2000 
FR No difference in compliance with water quality 
regulations 
SAAL and PARKER 
2001 
UK Privatisation increased profits but not productivity 
Source: RENZETTI and DUPONT (2003, 13). 
 
Mixed enterprises do not fit into this dispute and few studies were dedicated to 
investigate mixed ownership and performance. One of the fundamental studies was 
carried out by BOARDMAN and VINING (1989): looking at 489 enterprises (409 
private, 23 mixed and 57 public), they found that mixed enterprises perform about the 
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same or slightly better than public enterprises in terms of technical efficiency. 
Moreover, the scope for the comparison of firms is extremely tiny and tortuous in natural 
monopolies and markets for public goods, as water utilities are. Therefore, we decided to 
look at the relationship between regulation and performance to see whether and to what 
extent the former affects the latter. VICKERS and YARROW (1988, 44) argued that with 
no product market competition, the effectiveness of regulatory pricing will play a 
significant role in determining firms’ performance, almost independently of ownership 
matters (see next section)20. 
However, one way of simulating competitive markets is to initiate some competition for 
the market. DEMSETZ (1968) proposed that public utilities may be efficiently managed 
by assuming a franchise to the firm that offered to serve the market at the lowest tariff. 
As long as sufficient ex-ante competition exists, competing suppliers would lower prices 
to competitive levels.  
This intuition was confirmed by more recent economic theory: for example, RIORDAN 
and SAPPINGTON (1987), SAPPINGTON and STIGLITZ (1987) and LAFFONT and 
TIROLE (1993) supported the efficacy of franchise bidding processes. But in practice 
franchise bidding might fail because of many drawbacks. Notably, to have a successful 
competition for the market, we need a complete specification of the relevant contracts, a 
large number of participants for the initial right, the infeasibility of collusive agreements, 
and the existence of mechanisms to compensate the franchise holder for their sunk 
investment once they lose the contract (WILLIAMSON, 1976). Furthermore, franchise 
bidding does not take into account other aspects of the service that arise during the 
execution of the contract and need to be seriously tackled (see section 2.4). 
 
2.3.1. Regulation, information asymmetry and performance 
When the public intervenes as regulator, its major goal is still to maximise total economic 
surplus in the relevant market. This can be attained by stimulating operators to be 
technically efficient. But to succeed, the regulator should set optimal returns that induce 
firms (either private or public) to perform as efficiently as possible to raise some profit 
(that is, the right incentive).  
However, to set these optimal returns, regulators need a deep knowledge of the firms’ 
cost structure and their market demand curve. Only such information will allow them, at 
least in principle, to achieve any feasible regulatory goal by simply instructing regulated 
firms.  
In the real world, these variables are not easily observable from the outside and thus it is 
difficult to determine the level of effort to be requested of the service provider. 
 
20 On this issue, see also BISHOP and KAY (1988, 12). 
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Sometimes, even the firm itself has only a rough idea of the relationship between output 
and costs. In any case, regulated firms know more than regulators and have an incentive 
to strategically misreport information. Therefore, economists have looked for devices 
that, without relying on detailed knowledge, induce firms to behave in accordance with 
regulators’ aims.  
In this section, we provide the reader with a short and incomplete overview of some 
regulatory mechanisms. Our summary is far from being exhaustive, and aims only at 
stressing the fact that asymmetric information is the most important limitation on the 
effectiveness of regulation. Mixed enterprises can be a “structural” remedy to reduce this 
informational gap. Then, we look at how regulation could affect the performance of 
mixed enterprises in the Italian water sector. 
One form of regulation is the rate of return: it sets a level of earning that just allows the 
firm to reimburse its costs. This entails high administrative costs, long investigations and, 
last but not least, significant knowledge of the firm’s costs and consumers’ demands. For 
these complexities, regulatory agencies use accounting data rather than economic costs, 
despite their great differences (see SPULBER, 1989, 102).  
To circumvent informational requirement, several schemes have been proposed that 
provide the firm with sufficient incentives to enhance efficiency. We refer, for instance, 
to a mechanism proposed by SAPPINGTON and SIBLEY (1988)21 that allows regulation 
not to be based on the knowledge of the firm’s cost structure (but they need to be for the 
demand curve). The proposal was finally criticised by VOGELSANG (1988) because it 
fails to be controllable by third parties. Similarly, a proposal by VOGELSANG and 
FINSINGER (1979)22 was subsequently addressed by SAPPINGTON (1980): as the firm 
is asked to report its costs to the regulator, concerns are raised about the incentive to 
inflate its account23.  
The price-cap regime seems to start at the same point as the rate of return does. The 
principle behind the price-cap (or RPI – X) regulation is that firms cut costs when they 
receive appropriate rewards in the form of greater profit (see LITTLECHILD, 1983). But 
the tariff can be figured out only after an assessment of production costs and demand 
level has been made (SMALL, 1999, 15). Therefore, it is not difficult to draw the 
conclusion that implementing a price-cap in the context of informational asymmetries can 
be far from simple (see CREW and FRIEDMAN, 1991).  
Further efforts in this direction gave rise to new regulatory theories, by which in the 
presence of asymmetric information a regulator should offer incentives schemes, or a 
“menu of contracts” (from which the firm can choose the one most suitable to its needs) 
 
21 Relying on LOEB and MAGAT (1979). 
22 An interesting scheme, developed on RAMSEY (1927), which leads the firm to minimise costs and set 
Ramsey-optimal prices, even in case the regulator does not know either the demand or the cost function.
23 Possible devices to solve this problem were proposed, for example, by BARON and BESANKO (1984) 
with regards to auditing strategies.
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to induce the firm to disclose information. This theory developed substantially in the last 
decades [BARON and MYERSON (1982), and LAFFONT and TIROLE (1986)], but 
seems to have very little impact on the way regulation is carried out because of the 
difficulty of setting rules that regulators can apply. CREW and KLEINDORFER (2002) 
severely criticise this new approach, stressing the fact that it “is based in one way or 
another on assumptions like common knowledge that endow the regulator with 
information that he cannot have without a contested discovery process that always leaves 
him in a state far short of the level of information assumed in these theories. Common 
knowledge is the Achilles heel of mechanism design theory” (CREW and 
KLEINDORFER, 2002, 11). 
As a general conclusion, the less the asymmetric information between regulators and 
regulated firms, the more effective the price regulation will be, and finally the stronger 
the resulting efficiency enhancements attained by the operator.  
Therefore, we propose a structural solution as a means of allowing regulators to gather 
more information. Since our governance structure involves a rather heavy regulatory 
design, we stress its worthiness at least as a “transitory” device, to gradually lead public 
authorities to be more informed about private firm’s costs and efforts, thus accompanying 
them from in-house management to concession to totally private enterprise24.  
The public authorities might decide to own partially the regulated firm in order to:  
1) collect more precise information (on the board of directors) about actual costs and, 
thus,  
2) regulate more effectively, by inducing the private partner (i.e., the technological 
management) to make greater efforts towards cost reduction. 
We present a system by which information could flow upward to more informed and 
effective regulators. We refer to a complex three-tier regulatory structure25. Two tiers are 
inside the firm:  
- the technological management, which knows the technology of the firm; 
- the board of directors, which (informed by the technological management) decides on 
prices, outputs and production inputs.  
We reasonably assume that the board is imperfectly informed about what is known to the 
former, but at least private and public representatives on the board have the same 
information. The third tier, outside the firm, is embodied by:  
 
24 However, when certain conditions apply, advantages can be durable, and therefore this scheme can be 
maintained in the long-run. 
25 Even though related to a different issue, (i.e., the extent to which public firms should be privatised), see 
BÖS (1991, 139) and BÖS and PETERS (1988, 236). 
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- the (external) regulator, in which local authorities partake and to which public sector 
representatives (on the board of the firm) pass all relevant information about actual 
costs.  
 
Fig. 3: Information flow in our mixed enterprise model 
 
 
We then see how this mechanism can make economic regulation more effective (and thus 
operators more efficient) in the Italian water sector. Art. 13 of the Galli Law26 identifies 
the tariff as the instrument for ensuring the economic viability of water and wastewater 
management. In 1996, the Supervisory Committee on the Use of Water Resources 
(COVIRI)27 proposed a method, well-known as the Standard Method, to set and revise 
tariffs28. 
The Standard Method establishes a benchmark tariff which serves as basis for setting and 
adjusting actual tariffs in each basin. The benchmark tariff is a suitable instrument to 
achieve adequate service levels, finance investment programmes while maintaining sound 
finance, containing costs, enhancing efficiency and protecting consumers’ interests. The 
formula for the computation of the benchmark tariff for the current year (year n) is the 
following: 
                                                 
26 The Galli Law (Law no. 36 of January 1994) introduced the water sector reform in Italy. It offset the 
extensive fragmentation of the Italian water system, in order to allow operators to exploit economies of 
scale and scope, respectively by creating new and larger areas (so-called ATOs, optimal territorial basins) 
and by vertically integrating the entire water cycle. 
27 COVIRI was set up under the Galli Law and it has the following purpose: to oversee the implementation 
of the reform and the subsequent management of the service in order to guarantee the observance of the 
principles of efficiency, efficacy and cost-effectiveness, as well as the regular determination and adjustment 
of rates and the safeguarding of users’ interests.
28 Metodo Normalizzato (or Standard Method) for defining cost components and determining the reference 
tariff was approved by Decreto Ministeriale 1/8/1996. 
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Tt = (C + A + R) t-1 * (1 + I + K) 
Where: 
- Tt = tariff of current year (t); 
- C = operating expenditure; 
- A = depreciation; 
- R = remuneration of invested capital; 
- I = projected inflation for current year; 
- K = price-cap. 
 
To evaluate the incentives (to productive efficiency) provided by this method, we focus 
on operating costs (C). Following the identification of the governance structure (in-house, 
cPPP or iPPP), project operating costs (CPt) are to be quantified29; afterwards, they have 
to be compared with “modelled” operating costs (CMt), which represent the point of 
reference to measure and regulate the water service companies performance.  
To determine appropriate incentives, the ATO Authority (regulatory agency at the local 
level with the task of regulating tariff and service quality) needs to estimate correctly 
CMt.  
Once CMt are calculated, the factor K (or price-cap) can be derived from. The value of Kt 
is according to this scale: 
- when CPt > CMt (1 + 0.2)    Æ   Kt ≥ 2%; 
- when CMt < CPt ≤ CMt (1 + 0.2)   Æ   Kt ≥ 1%; 
- whereas CPt ≤ CMt     Æ   Kt ≥ 0.5%. 
Then, efficiency enhancements have to follow this formula:  
CPt = CPt-1 (1 - Kt) 
Where: 
- CPt = project operating costs for the current year; 
- CPt-1 = project operating costs for the previous year; 
- Kt = price cap. 
 
29 “From a methodological point of view, the estimated project operating costs necessitate an analysis 
being made of the following fundamental elements: the personnel required for the management of the 
integrated water service; the supply of materials and water purchased by third parties, the predicted cost of 
electricity; the identification of the vehicles and real estate required to organize the supply activity 
completely (…) In the majority of the Basin Plans examined, the estimates regarding personnel and other 
operating costs are carried out on the basis of productivity parameters and unit costs referring to the 
principal quantities regarding the service in the territory of the basin” (COVIRI, 2004, 78). 
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Enterprises are pushed to perform better when the value of CMt is properly set lower than 
CPt [for example, when CPt > CMt (1 + 0.2), the price-cap K is at least 2%]. 
Currently, to obtain the value of CMt, ATO Authorities make use of some econometric 
models to establish the costs of drinking water distribution, sewage and treatment 
(COVIRI, 2004, 79). Participation on the board of the firm facilitates the public 
authorities gathering of more precise information from the technological management 
about these costs. In particular, the information needed concerns the volumes supplied, 
the network length, electricity costs, water expenditures, total number of users, the 
difficulties in water treatment, some plants characteristics and other variables (including 
pollution extent). This information can be passed by public sector representatives on the 
board to the (external) regulator and finally used by the latter to set CMt that induce 
inefficient operators to outperform.  
There are several ways to complete this informational transfer from the board of the firm 
to the ATO Authority: in the simplest case, public sector representatives in the firm could 
verify that the board of directors is correctly reporting to the regulator on the basis of the 
data originating from the management. 
Nowadays, in the Italian water sector, we do not observe a significant upward flow of 
relevant information, neither in mixed nor in totally public enterprises. If one of the 
regulators’ objectives is to induce service providers to increase productive efficiency, we 
must recognise that they were rather disappointing: in 2004, in 32 basins (out of 43), CMt 
were never below CPt (see fig. 4), which means that Kt was at its lowest value (0.5%). 
However, this evidence is not telling enough if we consider that such values, taken from 
the Basin Plans, refer to the first year of concession when learning-by-doing still is 
absent. 
Several reasons are hindering the correct working of the mechanism illustrated above. 
Some can be summed up as follows: public representatives within the firm do not have 
the expertise to successfully carry out their monitoring activity or are not yet aware that 
they represent a crucial source of information; they have been captured by private sector 
representatives; public sector representatives (in our model assumed to be social welfare 
maximisers) could pursue profit maximisation as well as the private sector (this 
phenomenon, can be defined as “public opportunism”); but also other distorting factors 
could have taken place. In conclusion, the short period of time during which the reform 
has been implemented still does not provide best practices. Raising consciousness of the 
public authorities representatives’ role within the board of the firm and clearer rules 
disciplining the overall regulatory design (mainly to prevent regulatory capture) could 
help in attaining superior results. 
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Fig. 4: Regulation and performance in 43 ATOs 
 
Own elaboration on data CRS PROAQUA (2005, 60). 
 
To close, we propose mixed enterprises as a suitable instrument to reduce asymmetric 
information and, thus, achieve better performance (induced by regulators). Potentially, 
our model allows exploiting private know-how and capabilities without facing 
overwhelming information constraints. It is obvious that for the above mechanism to 
work properly, public representatives must have specific skills (i.e., expertise, high 
ethical standards) to monitor activities rigorously and independently. 
 
2.4. Information costs 
As described, the public authorities’ participation in the capital of regulated firms can 
facilitate regulators (in which local authorities are involved) to drastically reduce its 
burden of asymmetric information. Through it, the public authority is in the position to 
maintain an insider’s view of operations, giving rise to a sort of internal control rather 
than a mere external regulation30. 
We understand internal control in a very general way. It is not only control over the 
firm’s technological process (as we have seen in the previous section), but also 
monitoring the proper fulfilment of contractual obligations. In other words, we develop 
beyond price regulation to stress another advantage of our mixed enterprise model. 
In local utilities, tariff regulation is not the only element to be carefully taken into 
account, as many other aspects deserve at least equal consideration. We share the 
GOLDBERG (1976) intuition, according to which regulation can be seen as an implicit 
“administered contract”. In this section, we investigate whether and how our mixed 
enterprise model can decrease costs necessary to make concessions work properly, that is, 
                                                 
30 A clarifying interpretation has been offered by BÖS (1991), who considers mixed enterprises as a tool by 
which public partner representatives and protégés could provide the regulator with inside information, like 
“spies” in the firm (see BÖS, 1991, 54). 
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meeting public service obligations, satisfactory quality standards, environmental 
sustainability, and so on.  
In order to cover all these requirements, governments would need to prepare long-term 
contracts of thousands and thousands of pages to limit unfair conduct (i.e., private firm 
opportunism). Once signed, the service provider is expected to comply with contractual 
terms. However, even though precise and comprehensive clauses are set, these long-term 
contracts remain inevitably incomplete31.  
It has been largely recognised that when we adopt an incomplete contracting perspective, 
ownership becomes extremely relevant, and mixed enterprises can accomplish it.  
“One of the insights of the recent literature on the firm is that, if the only imperfections 
are those arising from moral hazard or asymmetric information, organizational form -
including ownership and firm boundaries- does not matter: an owner has no special 
power or rights since everything is specified in an initial contract (at least among the 
things that can ever be specified). In contrast, ownership does matter when contracts are 
incomplete: the owner of an asset or firm can then make all decisions concerning the 
asset or firm that are not included in an initial contract (the owner has residual control 
rights). Applying this insight to the privatization context yields the conclusion that in a 
complete contracting world the government does not need to own a firm to control its 
behaviour: any goals- economic or otherwise- can be achieved via a detailed initial 
contract. However, if contracts are incomplete, as they are in practice, there is a case for 
the government to own an electricity company or prison since ownership gives the 
government special powers in the form of residual control rights” (HART, 2002, 69). 
We go on to discuss a peculiar feature of mixed enterprises: all disputes and controversies 
arising from incomplete concession contracts can be solved “internally”, on the board of 
directors, with no recourse to third parties, such as courts or arbitrators. 
Problems arising in concessions to private enterprises are well summarised by GUASCH, 
LAFFONT and STRAUB (2005). Looking at a considerable number of public service 
concessions in Latin America, they conclude that private sector involvement can imply 
many clashes: among them, conflicts with operators in complying with the contract, 
abandonment of the concession, claimed bankruptcy, poor attention to users and, above 
all, contract renegotiations to the detriment of consumers. 
In fact, because of their incomplete nature, contracts must constantly be revised and/or 
renegotiated as time goes on (see GUASH, 2005). When circumstances change, for 
 
31 Incomplete contracts theory is more realistic and useful than the agency theory in showing the practical 
difficulties in regulating local utilities. It starts from the more pragmatic assumption that a “complete” 
contracting of agents’ future actions is impossible when no one can verify ex-post the real value of 
performances. On the other side, however, such a theory takes for granted agents’ rationality and no 
asymmetric information. Uncertainty arises because each agent has to act in absence of complete 
information on the outcome of his behaviour since it cannot anticipate with certainty what the other will do 
(for an overview, see BROUSSEAU and GLACHANT, 2002, 11). 
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example, the private operator aims at adjusting contractual terms to its own advantage, 
seeking a better deal than the initial one (i.e., by asking for lower quality requirements 
and/or fewer universal service obligations at a given tariff level, etc.): as a partial remedy, 
revisions and/or renegotiations are to be settled in agreement with the regulator. The less 
the regulator is able to verify how the private sector partner executes the contract, the less 
it will be a valid counter-party.  
Private opportunism is one of the main concerns public authorities need to overcome to 
gain public confidence. Everywhere, the conventional instrument by which local 
authorities control service providers is the Service Contract; in the Italian water sector, 
this is called Management Convention32. It is negotiated between the ATO Authority 
(AATO) and the integrated water service manager. As it was not feasible to make a 
survey of all management conventions adopted in 91 ATOs, we looked at the Standard 
Convention, which is drawn up by the Region and represents the starting point to write 
the Management Convention33. The conclusion we draw is that the adopted Standard 
Conventions are deficient in many respects and do not represent a useful instrument by 
which AATOs can draft exhaustive Management Conventions. Therefore, alternative 
tools are needed to cope with incompleteness of contracts. 
Mixed enterprises can represent, under certain conditions, a viable solution to reduce 
uncertainty about private partner’s future conduct and address any type of concern, above 
all renegotiations, internally to the firm34. Firstly, the perception of more stringent public 
monitoring potentially limits the extent to which the private sector could ask for 
renegotiations. Secondly, during the renegotiation process, the public authority could 
attenuate exaggerated requests because it has more information and, at best, solve 
controversies on the board of the firm without recourse to courts or arbitrators. 
 
32 Generally, it could be defined as the legal instrument that local authorities use whenever they assign the 
service management to third parties. According to the guidelines furnished by COVIRI, through the service 
contract local authorities proceed to set the qualitative and quantitative objectives that they want to achieve 
and the conditions under which the service must be supplied to the users; lay down the obligations the 
provider has to fulfil in order to realize, under the agreed economic and financial conditions, such 
objectives; forecast and guarantee how to verify and control over the functioning of the service activities 
and the management outcomes;  represent what services are to be guaranteed to the users, also for the 
purpose of safeguarding the “consumer rights” as acknowledged and guaranteed in the Service Charter (see 
COVIRI, 2004, 98). 
33 To investigate Standard Convention, we refer to a Report by COVIRI (2002), entitled “The standards 
convention on the integrated water service in regional legislation and regulations”, that is an ad-hoc survey 
of the Standard Conventions actually adopted as at 2001. In this Report, COVIRI pointed out the major 
limits found in this important regulatory instrument. 
34 Required conditions concern the level of expertise, ethical standards and independence of public 
representatives. In the ATO 4 Alto Valdarno experience, these conditions were missing, and in particular 
public representatives were incapable of protecting the public interest by dismantling the private sector 
requests. After each claim, the ATO started investigations appointing external experts to identify what costs 
were due to unforeseen external factors and what costs were due to inefficiencies. The recourse to external 
accountants in itself was symptomatic of their inability to exploit the participation in the capital of the firm 
and on the board of directors to gather information and/or to use this information for the public benefit. On 
the issue, see LOBINA (2005). 
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The EC (2004a) highlighted the main advantage that mixed enterprises imply as follows:  
“Direct cooperation between the public partner and the private partner in a forum with a 
legal personality allows the public partner, through its presence in the body of 
shareholders and in the decision-making bodies of the joint entity, to retain a relatively 
high degree of control over the development of the projects, which it can adapt over time 
in the light of circumstances” (EC, 2004a, § 54).  
From this point of view, the board of directors can represent the ideal institution where 
public and private representatives can settle disputes. 
This idea has been developed by BÖS (1991), according to whom the board of directors 
can be seen as a forum in which public and private representatives advocate their 
respective interests (social welfare and profit maximisation) and make compromises to 
fine-tune the firm’s objective. 
A simple model and one graph (fig. 5) help in understanding how the board can work. 
BÖS (1991, 136) considers a board that consists of Θ percent of private shareholders’ 
representatives, while (1 - Θ) percent of public representatives. Assuming that private 
shareholders maximise profit while the public authority pursues welfare maximisation, 
the author deduces that the two groups of representatives arrive at a compromise, which 
is a mixed objective function where profit and social welfare carry the percentage weight 
of their respective supporters on the board. 
Considering a one-product monopoly which sells its output z at price p, the objective of 
the mixed enterprise (Φ) is: 
Φ = Θ * Π + (1 – Θ) * [S(p) + Π]  
Where welfare is measured by the sum of consumer surplus [S(p)] and the profit of the 
firm (Π).  
In fig. 5, the straight line (curve a) represents the ultimate objective function which 
depends only and simply on the public-private capital shares; it assumes a linear 
continuous move from welfare to profit maximisation as the degree of privatisation 
moves from 0% to 100%. However, this function is altered by the rules and mechanisms 
which apply on the board, principally, the majority rule by which the group that owns the 
majority can dictate everything (curve c). More realistically, BÖS proposes to consider 
the mixed enterprise’s objective function as a logistic form of an increase in the 
bargaining power (curve b).  
Curve b seems to be more suitable for our purpose, as we want to highlight that our 
mixed enterprise and its board can represent a more “relational” institution to handle all 
those concerns arising from incompleteness of contracts. In our view, a continuous and 
smoothly interaction on the board of directors denotes a valid adaptive mechanism to 
cope with uncertainty and complexity. 
Alessandro Marra, Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an   
Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities 
 
  26  
In the next section, we suggest some corporate governance rules to guarantee a fruitful 
interaction on the board and prevent deadlocks; these rules should define clearly the 
public partner objective and limit its task to carry out control activities over the service 
management run by the private sector.  
 
3. Policy implications 
Corporate governance represents the key issue in letting the board work properly. Such 
rules should allow the public authority to exert some effective control over the private 
sector, while limiting disproportionate public interference into the private administration 
of the mixed enterprise.  
As explained recently by the Italian Supervisory Committee: 
“A new governance of mixed companies in such a context could facilitate the task of the 
municipalities in performing this dual role [in the regulated companies and in the agency 
with the task of regulating tariffs and service quality] by limiting the action of the public 
partner of the mixed company to a role more closely linked to control over the 
contractual obligations rather than management tasks. At the same time, a clear 
definition of governance could avoid the potential conflict arising between the interests of 
the private partners and those of the public partners, giving rise to distorted and 
contradictory signals being sent to the company management, thus nullifying the 
objectives of the privatisation” (COVIRI, 2004, 97). 
Well aware that the study of this field asks for further theoretical streams of research and 
analytical tools, we set out a few guidelines to facilitate a balanced public involvement in 
the firm. 
In the first place, public representatives on the board of the firm should be as well 
informed as the private ones about what is known to the technological management. This 
is an essential starting point. Otherwise, regulatory capture might easily occur: the 
regulator is captured by the regulated not only in the case of corruption, but also in case 
the latter has greater technical know-how (or easier access to information) than the 
former. Consequences can be no less serious (see MURARO, 2004, 7).  
In the second place, public representatives should transfer information to the (external) 
regulator to reduce its intrinsic asymmetry. If information does not flow upward, private 
operators will end up using this gap to their exclusive advantage. As seen above, the 
correct upward flow of information requires expertise on the part of the representatives of 
the public authorities, but also independence. The risk of corruption could be even more 
tangible in mixed enterprises as public authorities and the private sector work side by side 
on the board; therefore, the necessary autonomy of the public authority must be ensured. 
Then, to protect the general interest, we can rely on two complementary institutions: the 
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external regulator and the board of directors.  
Concerning the latter, we need to enable representatives of the public authorities to fulfil 
their task even in case of minority participation. Whereas the private partner has a 
significant proportion of shares (Θ), corporate rules must guarantee a minimum 
bargaining power (mbg) to the public partner. This can be done by limiting privatisation 
to maximum share thresholds (MΘ) or by means of special mechanisms which limit the 
private partner’s bargaining power to Mbg (see fig. 5.2). 
Concerning capital shares, the private Θ can be higher than 50% but lower than MΘ to let 
the public authorities have some say on the board. In case privatisation is higher than 
MΘ, rules of corporate governance should ensure that private bargaining power is limited 
to a maximum (Mbg) to allow public representatives to sustain the general interest when 
seriously under threat.  
On the other hand, a disproportionate public interference into the private management 
might undermine an economically viable administration of the firm35. Therefore, in case 
of public majority, privatisation should never be below mΘ or the private sector should at 
least, through ad hoc corporate governance rules, have some minimum bargaining power 
(mbg) to defend its prerogative to cost-effectiveness. 
 
Fig. 5: Capital sharing and bargaining power in absence and presence of corporate 
governance 
  
Source: BÖS (1991) and own elaboration. 
                                                 
35 Public representatives, for example, could lean toward social welfare maximisation by hiring more 
employees than necessary. 
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Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to present an economic analysis of the specific 
configuration of mixed enterprise in which the public partner acts as controller, while the 
private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggested that this scheme 
could embody, under certain conditions, a valuable alternative to traditional public 
provision and concession to totally private enterprises as it can push regulated operators 
to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunistic conducts. Missing best practices 
cannot restrain us from adopting a constructive approach. 
To develop our analysis, we adopted the insights offered by property rights theory. In 
particular, we widely relied on the assumption that ownership allows the (public) owner 
to gather more information about the actual management of the firm.   
Following such a stream of research, we concluded that mixed enterprises could 
significantly reduce the asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms 
by implementing a sort of internal regulation. With more information, the public 
authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory 
agency) can stimulate the service provider to cut operating costs and can monitor it more 
effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (public services 
obligations, quality standards, etc.).  
To work properly, information needs to flow upward from the technological 
management, through the board of directors, to the (external) regulator. This transfer can 
be realised only if public representatives on the board hold high expertise and ethical 
standards, and act in complete independence. 
Moreover, concerning these contractual requirements, the mixed enterprise board of 
directors can represent the suitable place where public and private representatives 
(respectively, social welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes usually 
arising from incomplete contracts.  
Data are taken from the Italian water sector. As soon as the reform implementation will 
provide more comprehensive evidence, we will use the analytical support presented in 
this paper to test our propositions more precisely. 
We addressed three specific issues: 1) how is the performance of regulated firms affected 
by regulation rather than by other factors, such as ownership; 2) whether our mixed 
enterprise model can represent an effective governance structure, by means of which the 
public authority (as owner/controller of the firm, but also as member of the regulatory 
body) is able to reduce the burden of asymmetric information to regulate; 3) whether our 
model allows cutting transaction costs by solving on the board of directors all disputes 
between the public and the private, with no recourse to courts or arbitrators. 
We concluded that in iPPPs production costs and information costs can be lower than in 
the case of in-house provision or concession to totally private enterprise. 
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Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention into the “private” 
administration of the firm (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) could 
imply too many drawbacks, we suggest setting corporate governance rules to make 
feasible an equitable debate on the board. 
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